

COUNTRY: SAUDI ARABIA (SA),  
BAHRAIN (BA) REPORT NO: 6 884 5018 BA

TITLE: A REVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC CALL PARTY  
(HIZB AL DAWA AL ISLAMITA (U))

DATE OF INFO: 840100 REPORT DATE: 840219  
(BY SOURCE INFO) (BY SOURCE INFO)

ORIGINATOR: [REDACTED] REQ REFERENCES: K-3C-00018,  
U-RD-42813; K-051-00046

SOURCE: (U) 6384 0043. A FRIENDLY FOREIGN MILITARY GROUP WITH ACCESS  
TO THE INFORMATION REPORTED. SOURCE HAS REPORTED RELIABLY  
IN THE PAST AND THE INFORMATION IS CONSIDERED ACCURATE.

SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN) THIS IIR FORWARDS A REPORT ON THE ISLAMIC CALL  
PARTY (HIZB AL DAWA AL ISLAMITA), PRESUMABLY PREPARED BY  
THE BAHRAIN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SEE IIR  
684 5007 BA, 6 884 5008 BA, AND 6 884 5009 BA).  
IT SPEAKS TO THE HISTORY OF THE PARTY; ITS GOALS; THE FOREIGN  
LINKS OF BAHRAIN ICP; AND GIVES CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE PARTY'S  
CONTINUED ACTIVITY IN BAHRAIN.

DETAILS: (U) NONE.

POOR QUALITY ORIGIN AT.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY DATT  
REVW: 19 FEB 2000

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFICATION  
DATA

Page 1 of 2 Pages

DD FORM 1296

**PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE**

Page 1 of 2 Pages

FADHALLAH, Md. HASAYN

000065

DD FORM 1296

**PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE**

Page 1 of 2 Pages

32

ix

33

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT  
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA  
Individual Items Of This Report Are  
UNCLASSIFIED Unless Otherwise Indicated

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS  
SECRET//NOFORN  
REPORT NO: 6 884 5018 84  
COLL MGMT CODES: A8

PROJECT NO: NONE  
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC ☐ Y ☐ N

PREPARED BY: JOHN F. STONE, CDR, USN, ALUSNA  
APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ REQUEST EVALUATION: ☒ BY ☐ ON  
Request Evaluation Releasable To: NONE

1 ENCLOSURE(S): (SECRET/NOFORN)

7. REPORT ENTITLED "A REVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC CALL PARTY (HIZB AL DAWA AL ISLAMIYA) IN BAHRAIN - JANUARY 1984, 6 PAGES, 1 COPY. REPORT IS CLASSIFIED SECRET/NOFORN.

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:  
DIA (Original) W/ENCL

**SUBJECT/LOCATION CODES**  
(For DIA Use Only)

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

.. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Page 2 of 2 Pages

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

**SECRET**

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

**A REVIEW OF THE ISLAMIC CALL PARTY (HIZB AL DAWA AL ISLAMIYA)****IN BAHRAIN - JANUARY, 1984****SECRET/NOFORN****BRIEF BACKGROUND**

1. The Islamic Call Party (ICP) was formed in Iraq in the mid-1950s by the late **MOHAMED BAKER SADR**, the Shia religious leader from Najaf who was executed by the Iraqis in April, 1980. In 1977 his doctrine was adopted by members of the Islamic Enlightenment Society in Bahrain which, under other titles, had existed since 1972. The ICP was purged by the Iraqi Ba'ath regime after the revolution in Iran in 1979 and went underground in Bahrain now pay homage to **ABDOL QASSIM MUHAMMED BAKER SADR**'s successor (living in Iran), and to **MOHAMED TUSSEIN BAKER HUSSEIN**, leader of the so-called Iraq Liberation Army which is made up mostly of Iraqi Shia opposing Saddam Hussein.

**THE ISLAMIC ENLIGHTENMENT SOCIETY IN BAHRAIN**

2. In Bahrain support for the ICP comes mainly from the rural areas and is centered on the Society's offices at Dhrak. The Society was formed by **ABDOL QASSIM MUHAMMED BAKER SADR** at Jeddah in 1972 when they returned to Bahrain from religious studies in Najaf. This was the year when there were elections for the Constituent Assembly in Bahrain and the two Shia formed the Society in order to establish a Shia power base within the Assembly, to which **EISSA QASSIM** was elected. Until 1979 the Society was mainly religious, but with the advent of the revolution in Iran in 1979 it immediately became political. Its leaders identified themselves with **KHOMENI** first and with the liberation struggle in Iraq second. Solidarity with the revolution in Iran became the cornerstone of the Society's policy and after a meeting in Najaf representative of the ICP in Bahrain. Thereafter the ICP in Bahrain, making full use of the Society, embarked upon a programme of covert operations in the Shia areas, designed to politically awaken the Shia and to harness them to **KHOMENI**'s Islamic crusade.

3. **EISSA AHMED QASSIM** headed the Society since it was first established (with **ALI JAHRI** as his deputy) but at the beginning of December, 1983 there was a change in the leadership (known as the Managing Committee) when one **IBRAHIM HASSAN IBRAHIM ABD ALI** was made President in place of **EISSA QASSIM**. **IBRAHIM** is a young Shia mulla of extreme views and both **EISSA QASSIM** and **ALI JAHRI** were compelled to endorse his election because of the popularity he enjoyed as an outspoken militant who had attracted many young Shia to the Society. At this juncture it appears that **EISSA QASSIM** still retains control of the Society from behind the scenes and is able to manipulate **IBRAHIM**. All twelve members of the present Managing Committee are ICP adherents and through the Society's legitimacy have an ideal platform from which to project an image of moderation while secretly propagating the actual Party. The clandestine ICP leadership is therefore synonymous with that of the legitimate and overt Society leadership, as follows:

- |   |                                   |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1. <b>IBRAHIM HASSAN IBRAHIM ABD ALI</b>    | - President                       |
| 2. <b>ABDOL HASSAN AHMED ABD ALI</b>        | - Vice President                  |
| 3. <b>ALI ABDOULLAH SHARAF</b>              | - Secretary                       |
| 4. <b>DARWISH SAIED SHARAF JAHAD</b>        | - Treasurer                       |
| 5. <b>MUHAMMAD ALI HASSAN AHMED HAMADA</b>  | - Religious Studies Sub-Committee |
| 6. <b>JAFER AHMED MOHAMED AHMED SHITHAB</b> | - Information Sub-Committee       |
| 7. <b>IBRAHIM HASSAN IBRAHIM</b>            | - Administration member           |
| 8. <b>ALI MUHAMMAD ALI HASSAN AHMED</b>     | - Administration member           |
| 9. <b>IBRAHIM HASSAN</b>                    | - Programmes Sub-Committee        |
| 10. <b>IBRAHIM HASSAN</b>                   | - Social Sub-Committee            |
| 11. <b>MUHAMMAD HASSAN</b>                  | - Library Sub-Committee           |

**SECRET/NOFORN**

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

contd. ....

**SECRET**

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

4. The ICP in Bahrain has an excellent underground structure of its own which is so secretive that much about it still needs to be learnt. Within it there may be (and probably are) other Shia leaders who are more directly concerned with Party activity, but even if this is so the authority of political direction is still vested in the Managing Committee of the Islamic Enlightenment Society.

**AIMS OF THE ISLAMIC CALL PARTY**

- To educate Shia youth in Islamic culture and rules.
  - To use Islamic rules as a basis for political indoctrination (as laid down in the doctrine of **MOHAMED BAKER SADR** and **ABDOL QASSIM KHOLE**).
  - To work in secret to promote the ICP, recruiting those whose reliability and religious integrity have been tested and proven.
  - To attain a membership of ten thousand, at which point the ICP will embark on overt political action. Until that stage is reached, senior organisers will work to establish solid foundations in the Shia villages.
  - To achieve the ultimate goal of overthrowing the Al Khalifa and establishing an Islamic State free from foreign influence and similar to Iran.
6. **ALI SHARQI** considers the ICP of Iraq to have become a well-organised militant underground movement which should be emulated in Bahrain, and he contends that before the ICP there resorted to armed struggle it ensured that the Iraqi Shia masses had been awakened to Islamic principles. This was why the ICP in Bahrain had concentrated on awakening the youth in all Shia areas.
7. The ICP's aims, at village level, given in writing at Dhrak on 5 December, 1982 to a recruit by **IBRAHIM AHMED QASSIM**, were described thus:
- 'Every building has strong foundations and every revolution must likewise have a solid republican base to provide firm resistance. Therefore the people are currently building the foundations by awakening and alerting the youth and filling their minds with fundamentalist Islamic principles.'
  - 'The youth is being prepared to defend the movement when the armed struggle (against the Government) starts. They are being trained to give their lives for the religious cause and the seed of love for the Jihad (holy war) is being sown in them.'

**FUNDS**

8. The Shia contribute generously to their causes through their Matam infrastructure or otherwise, as a religious and social obligation, and money is not a problem for the ICP. But the main providers are the wealthy Shia merchants in Bahrain and Kuwait, one of the leading ones being the millionaire, **HASSAN HAIDER DARWISH**.

9. Funds are transferred abroad to support Bahrainis in Iran and Syria, but care is taken not to allow any to be channelled to **MADH** **MUDARASSI**'s organisation, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which ICP leaders want nothing to do with.

10. In Bahrain the main recipients of ICP funds are reported to be:

- |  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| 1. <b>EISSA AHMED QASSIM</b>                 | - Judge            |
| 2. <b>ABDOL KHALAF AHMED ASTEER</b>          | - Judge            |
| 3. <b>MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD SALAHU SIBI</b>      | - Mulla            |
| 4. <b>MUHAMMAD SALAH AHMED ABUL MUHAMMAD</b> | - DAPCO employee   |
| 5. <b>ABDOL KHALAF AHMED</b>                 | - DAPCO employee   |
| 6. <b>ABDOL HUSSAIN AHMED</b>                | - DATELCO employee |

**SECRET****SECRET/NOFORN**

P.0014

11. Collections are consolidated by ABDUL AMIR al JAMRI, with a float being kept at the Bahrain branch of Bank Mellat Iran and the balance being passed to MIRZA MOHAMED SALEH ABADI to transfer abroad. He sent U.S. 10,000 collected in November, 1983 by courier to the UAE where transfers are reported to be effected through the Lebanese Ambassador.

#### PROPAGANDA

12. The Society makes recordings in cassette form of lectures by all the main Shia religious leaders who expound the Shia revolutionary message. A multi-recording machine in the Society's offices at Diraz enables eighty copies of a cassette to be reproduced in a day, and these are given wide circulation.

13. The volume of ICP written propaganda entering Bahrain has never been very great and is mostly pro-KHOMENI and anti-Iraq and US involvement in the Gulf. Much of it comes by mail from Tehran (POB 98/22 or POB 615/71), or from Kuwait ('Dar al Tawhid', POB 3518 or 'Dar al Khaliq', POB 659, Safat), but during August, 1983 copies of 'The Discoverer' (Al Kashif) were received from London.

#### ISLAMIC CULTURAL LIBRARY

14. The Cultural Library in Manama is controlled by the Enlightenment Society (and therefore the ICP) and receives revolutionary cassettes and literature as described above. It is also an indoctrination centre for young ICP supporters. Women members receive religious lectures by post from 'Dar al Tawhid' Press in Kuwait.

#### RECRUITMENT

15. In Qum on 10 January, 1981 (HASSAN GHARIB) of the ICP said, 'The ICP of Bahrain operates in greater secrecy than does the Islamic Front and its members are carefully vetted before recruitment; vetting can take up to two years'. The recruitment of one (ABDUL HADI ALI ABDULLA) in June, 1981, followed this pattern. In his confession he described an invitation from (EISSA SHARQI) in May, 1981 to attend lectures and meetings held by him (EISSA SHARQI) and (SULAIMAN MUHAMMAD) but it was not until February, 1982 that he was made a member of the Party during a type of ceremony at Al Louisa Mosque in Jid Hafa.

16. ICP recruiting is certainly very selective and secretive, contrasting greatly with the Enlightenment Society's mass-awakening activities.

#### WOMEN'S WING

17. The Society's programme for the religious indoctrination of Shia women is organised by (ABDUL HUSSAIN AHMED KADIM MUSTAFAD) who holds regular classes for them at the Society's offices at Diraz or in the villages where the women's movement has grown steadily in recent years. Shia women now take an active part in most of the religious-political activities organised by the Society on behalf of the ICP, but as far as is known at present, women belong to only one ICP cell.

#### ISLAMIC UNITY MOVEMENT

18. This somewhat obscure movement comes to notice intermittently. In March, 1983 it was described by an ICP member as the secret political wing of the Enlightenment Society/ICP, formed after the revolution in Iran with the custodial responsibility of preventing poaching and subversion of ICP members by the rival Islamic Front. The leaders of the 'wing' are reported to be:

1. (SULAIMAN MUHAMMAD MUSTAFAD)
2. (ABDUL AMIR AHMED KADIM)
3. (MANSOUR ALI HASSAN AHMED MUSTAFAD)

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET SECRET/NOFORN

36

SECRET/NOFORN

366-14 - BAH

IRAQ

BAH

BAH

BAH

BAH

contd. ....

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET/NOFORN

#### MAKTIYA GROUP OF THE ICP

19. On 21 November, 1983 three young Shia were arrested in Bahrain in possession of seditious literature. They were:

1. MOHAMED HUSSAIN MUHAMMAD - Lebanese; an electrician who came to work in Bahrain from Saudi Arabia in December, 1981.
2. RAJIR MAHMOOD MUHAMMAD - Bahraini from Malkiya; Ministry of Health storekeeper.
3. ABDULLA ALI ABDUL AZIZ - Bahraini from Malkiya.

20. The statements of BAQER and ABDULLA give a detailed account of the ICP organisation in their area and shed useful light on the Party's methods. The main points in the statements are as follows:

- (a) In 1978 ABDULLA became friendly with one HASSAN GHARIB who, in that year enlisted the following into a loose Shia group:
  1. BAQER MAHMOOD MUHAMMAD - a clerk at ALBA
  2. AMIR SALMAN - a teacher at Karzakhan
  3. HADI SALMAN - a teacher at Karzakhan
  4. JAFFER AHMED ALI - a teacher
  5. MOHAMED MAKI HUSSAIN

(b) After KHOMENI's victory in Iran in 1979 the group's allegiance was entirely to KHOMENI and its members started visiting the Islamic Enlightenment Society's offices at Diraz to attend debates and hear lectures by the following:

1. EISSA AHMED QASSIM
2. SULAIMAN MUHAMMAD MUSTAFAD
3. ABDUL AMIR al JAMRI
4. (HASSAN SAYED)
5. ISMAHIL MANSOUR IBRAHIM ABD ALI

(c) At the Society they learned of the ICP and were enlisted as apprentice members. From that time the group 'followed the Society openly and the line of the ICP secretly'.

(d) In 1980 they were formally recruited as ICP cell members by one (ALI MUHAMMAD ALI MANSOUR ABADI) son of the prominent Shia leader, (MUHAMMAD al ABADI) released from detention on 16 December, 1983. They in turn recruited a number of youths and students for religious training to be followed by political, ideological and revolutionary education, and their aim was to organise a revolution to overthrow the Government of Bahrain and set up an Islamic State.

21. The group established the ICP cellular organisation in Malkiya and in all enlisted about one hundred students, who were organised by ABDULLA into eight cells. They have passed the primary stage of religious training and have begun the secondary stage of political, ideological and revolutionary studies. The group, abetted by ALI AKRI and (ALI TURAJI) of Senabli, then began producing leaflets, working towards the following objectives:

- (a) to establish an illegal political organisation in Malkiya which would use force to overthrow the Government;
- (b) to provide training of the Government;
- (c) to recruit youths for revolutionary training, without the knowledge of their parents;
- (d) to hold secret meetings;
- (e) to distribute anti-Government/pro-KHOMENI leaflets

22. Prompted by ABDULLA, EISSA AHMED QASSIM agreed to form a women's section and to send a female lecturer to Malkiya. Five women and five girls were then recruited and one (NAIMA ABDUL NABI HAMID) was put in charge of them.

23. ABDULLA visited Iran for six weeks in 1979 with (HASSAN MAKI GHARIB) (AMIR SALMAN HUSSAIN) and (SADIQ MAHMOOD MUHAMMAD), returning via Syria and Italy. GHARIB later became the senior Bahraini ICP representative in Qum.

SECRET/NOFORN

SECRET

contd. ....

37

## ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET//NOFORN

24. The reported secret head of the ICP in Bahrain is EISSA AHMED GASSIM, working with three principal assistants, SULAIMAN MOHAMED al HASANI, ABDUL AMIR al JAMRI and ALI MOHAMED al AKRI. Other senior local leaders are reported to be IBRAHIM MANSOUR, IBRAHIM ABD ALI, HASSAN MAKI GHARIB and ALI ABDULLA SHARQI. (NOTE: None of the seven has ever admitted ICP connections.)

25. Bearing in mind that the ICP strength in Malkiya alone is described as being one hundred adherents, it would be naive to suppose that the overall ICP strength in Bahrain is less than three thousand. But it is probable that this figure embraces all Shia with ICP affiliations, however slender, including those in an early stage of indoctrination. The number of known active members of significance is 207, covering the predominantly Shia areas of Jig Hafa, Dath, Karzahan, Mani, Kowra, Toobli, Sanad and Rowadrat. It is in these areas that the Party appears to have most support.

26. The ICP has difficulty in recruiting the older generation Shia and is mainly a Party of the young and middle-aged.

## FOREIGN LIVES OF THE ICP, BAHRAIN

27. The Islamic Front trains between three hundred and four hundred men in Iran before the ICP trained any. In recent months there have been indications that the ICP may have started military training of a kind in Qum for its youth. Records for 1983 show that:

- (a) AHMED KHALAF AHMED ASFOUR, who owns property in Qum, visited Iran from June to August. His property houses an ICP group. On his return he said 100 Bahrainis were receiving religious and military training in Iran, paid monthly by the Iranian government, and implied that all belong to the ICP. He is a senior and influential Shia whose remarks should carry some weight, but the figure is thought to be exaggerated;
- (b) MIZZA MOHAMED SALEH ABDELVISIT Qum just after Al ASFOUR because his son is living there. On his return MIZZA was reported to have said his son is responsible for training 20 Bahrainis.

28. The ICP (Bahrain) is reported to have considerable influence among the Iraqi clergy in Qum. The following are the leading Bahraini ICP elements in Qum, where the link appears closer than that with any other place in Iran:

- 1. (JOSAPHIN SALMON FARSI) (a)
- 2. HASSAN AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR
- 3. MIZZA AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR
- 4. (JOSAF AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR)
- 5. (JOSAF AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR)
- 6. (JOSAF AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR)

(NOTE: The link to Qum appears to be inefficient and dependent upon visitors travelling between the two points.)

29. The Dar al Tawhid Press of Kuwait, from which ICP propaganda for various Gulf States emanates, appears to be under the effective control of the ICP of Iraq.

30. Since the 12 December, 1983 bomb explosions in Kuwait, two Bahraini Shia students at Kuwait University, (HAFER AHMED JASSIM al HASANI) and (ALI TAJER MOHAMED ABDUL WAHAB) have been reported as co-truck containing a bomb into the US Embassy compound. Apart from this connection (and the two had no previous record with us) there is no evidence in Bahrain of any link between the local ICP and those responsible for the incidents in Kuwait.

SECRET//NOFORN

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET

38

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SECRET//NOFORN

31. The only link with the Lebanon of which we are aware at present is that four figures of the Amal Party visited EISSA AHMED GASSIM in Bahrain in 1979 and lectured at the Enlightenment Society - they were:

- 1. MOHAMED HUSSAIN FADHAL ALI
- 2. MOHAMED HUSSAIN FADHAL ALI
- 3. MOHAMED HUSSAIN FADHAL ALI
- 4. MOHAMED HUSSAIN FADHAL ALI

32. In April, 1980 it was reported that the Society had links with a Shia group in Jeddah and London working for the liberation of 'the oppressed'. It was said that unnamed delegates of the Saudi group had visited Bahrain for secret discussions with ABDUL AMIR al JAMRI. In May, 1982 secret meetings were held in Mecca, Medina and Taif between Iranis and the following ICP supporters who went to Saudi as Omra pilgrims:

- 1. HASSAN AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR
- 2. HASSAN AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR
- 3. HASSAN AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR
- 4. HASSAN AHMED KHALAF ASFOUR

33. In November, 1983 (MIZZA MOHAMED SALEH ARAB) travelled to London to represent the Society at various Islamic functions organised by Bahraini, Iraqi and Iranian Shia studying in the United Kingdom. The Iraqi student body in London is known to support the ICP of Iraq.

34. A group of supporters of the ICP in Bahrain in the area of Saeeda Zainab's tomb in north Damascus receives financial aid from the Society in Bahrain, collected by (ABDUL AMIR al JAMRI) and carried by hand of one MOHAMED MOHAMED al HASANI.

## ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC FRONT

35. As long as EISSA AHMED GASSIM has known (HADI MODARASSI) the two have been at variance and this fact alone made the split in the Bahraini Shia between pro-MODARASSI (IFLB) elements and pro-Society/ICP elements inevitable. The Shia dispute its, however, sufficiently potent to act as a rallying point on the main issues and the ICP/IFLB split could easily disappear if the sect as a whole were to be inflamed and aroused.

## CONCLUSION

36. The Islamic Front's policy of open violent confrontation and its failed coup plot of December, 1981 represented so clear a threat in Bahrain that it has been the focus of attention. By contrast the ICP has worked its way up more secretly under the cover of the Islamic Enlightenment Society, gradually establishing rival claim to Shia attention in pursuit of an equally violent aim. Both the IFLB and the ICP aspire to achieve an Islamic state under Shia control by the overthrow of the Bahrain Government by force. They are rivals at present due partly to doctrinal differences and partly to personality differences among the leaders, but their purposes are identical.

37. The ICP and the Enlightenment Society must be considered one and the same - they share the same leaders and have the common religious and political objective of establishing Shia republican supremacy. The ICP is spreading cautiously in Bahrain while the Society does the groundwork and finances ICP interests overseas. The ICP may now be so entrenched in the rural areas of Bahrain that it will be neutralised only with enormous difficulty, and possibly only with a change of conditions abroad.

38. It is possible that sooner rather than later the ICP will have a cadre trained in Iran and therefore a terrorist capability. At this stage there is no reliable evidence of the existence of any ICP group in Bahrain capable of action similar to the attacks in Kuwait on 12 December. The leadership, for being Bahraini, is not as militant or extreme in practice as the Iraqi element, but within the ranks of both the ICP and IFLB there are undoubtedly fanatics. They and elements coming in from abroad, especially from Syria, Lebanon and Iran, are the immediate danger.

SECRET//NOFORN

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

39X